1. Review of Action Points from 15 August meeting – (5 mins)

2. Strategic & Thematic Updates:
   a. Strategic Update from Ninewa / KR-I PWGs (10 mins)
   b. Strategic Update from C/S PWG (10 mins)
   c. Thematic Update from GBV Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   d. Thematic Update from Child Protection Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   e. Thematic Update from Mine Action Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   f. Thematic Update from HLP Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   g. Strategic Update from CwC Task Force (10 mins)
   h. Update from NPC – Update on HNO process and Joint Needs Analysis Workshop (10 mins)
   i. Update from RPA mechanism (10 mins)

3. AOB

1. Review of Action Points from 15 August meeting

| UNHCR to liaise with GBVIM Coordinator wrt parameters/trend analysis on GBV incidents in Iraq to be further shared with wider NPC members. | Pending |

Minutes adopted without amendments.

2a. Strategic Update from KRI & Ninewa PWG

Ninewa

- Forced returns of IDPs from other governorates residing in Ninewa camps back to their governorates of origin continue, with four additional transfers organized since incidents reported in the 26 August 2019 CPI Note. Movements were organized from HAA 1 & 2 camps to Leylan 1 camp in Kirkuk governorate on 28 August (116 households (HHs)) and to Basateen Al Sheoukh (BAS) camp in Salah al-Din on 31 August (150 HHs); and from Hajj Ali camp to Al Karama (AK) camp in Salal al-Din governorate on 2 September (125 HHs), and to Leylan 2 camp in Kirkuk governorate on 5 September (86 HHs). According to camp management partners, since 23 August, about 2400 individuals1 have been forcibly returned to their governorates of origin. Movements continue to be organized without the engagement of the Ninewa Governorate Returns Committee (GRC). There is also room for further improvement to ensure movements are better organized and less harmful to affected populations. In HAA 1 & 2 camps, MoMD provided lists of IDPs to be forcibly returned to camp management one day prior to movements. Camp managers in Hajj Ali were informed on 1 September about movements the following day; they did not receive a list of IDPs until movement commenced. Short notice provided by MoMD has directly impacted camp management’s ability to prepare departure letters in a timely manner, contributing to delays in departure of convoys. In addition, the ISF has not provided clear and timely information regarding the final destinations of convoys until buses have entered the governorate-of-origin. This has impacted the provision of humanitarian assistance due to the inability of humanitarian actors to move resources in a timely manner, in addition to creating confusion as some final destinations, including BAS and AK camps, had previously been announced for closure by 1 September 2019. Prior to movement, MoMD seized IDPs’ civil documentation and informed them they would be returned once they arrived at the destination site. On the days of movements, IDPs have been asked to board busses after collecting departure letters and, in some convoys, after storing their belongings on trucks provided by MoMD. In some instances, humanitarian actors report that issues related to lack of clarity about areas of final destination or disagreements between authorities further delayed departures. Overall, movement preparations on the day of departure have taken between five to eight hours with IDPs waiting in busses and unable to exit despite high temperatures. No water or refreshment was initially provided by MoMD during movements. After local advocacy, MoMD provided water and refreshments on the 28 and 31 August movements, and humanitarian actors provided refreshments.
during the 2 and 5 September movements. In contrast with movement to Anbar on 23 August wherein MoMD branches in Ninewa and Anbar, as well as ISF operation commands did not coordinate movements on an inter-governorate level, humanitarian actors welcomed the close coordination between the Ninewa MoMD, Kirkuk MoMD, Ninewa Operations Command and Kirkuk Operations Command regarding Kirkuk movements. The 28 August convoy from HAA 1 & 2 camps arrived at Leylan 1 camp in Kirkuk at midnight after a ten-hour journey. A committee composed of members of national intelligence, intelligence of Special Forces Brigade 61, local police, federal police, and ISF prevented busses from accessing the camp. Instead, IDPs were directed to queue at the main gate to commence the security screening process, despite having undergone a security screening in Ninewa. The committee also did not allow the presence of humanitarian actors during the process, which was completed the following morning at 6:00. Five IDPs were detained during screening. One female IDP reported upon arrival that four family members had been arrested in Ninewa before departure to Leylan 1 camp. Additionally, a morning storm caused over 90 per cent of tents erected for new arrivals to be blown away, as a result of which IDPs newly arrived from Ninewa were forced to sleep in communal kitchens with little to no access to cooling until tents could be pitched once again. Security forces imposed a curfew and restrictions of movement on the returnees. On 29 August, the Chief of the Leylan Police reported that that only 200 of the 614 individual new arrivals possess civil documentation. IDPs told humanitarian actors their documentation had been confiscated in HAA 1 & 2 camps before departure and that they would receive their documents at the final destination; or that they had also lacked documentation in HAA 1 & 2. Humanitarian actors report that seized civil documentation has been sent by Ninewa security forces to Leylan police. The 31 August convoy from HAA 1 & 2 camps arrived at BAS camp in Salah al-Din at 13:00. A majority of HHs consisted of women, children, elderly persons and persons with special needs, originating mostly from Al Shirqat district, Balad district and Yathrib sub-district. Protection actors in BAS reported that a majority of families do not possess civil documentation and that local and federal police imposed restriction of movement outside of the camp. In the early morning hours of 1 September, unknown actors threw three sound bombs over the west side of the camp fence. Security actors, who were only patrolling the entrance to the camp, were not able to apprehend the perpetrators. The sound bombs caused no damage or casualties. On 2 September at 2:10 in the morning, two more sound bombs were thrown over the south side of the camp perimeter, and one more at 23:00 that evening. Additionally, residents from Al Shirqat city gathered outside of the camp demanding IDPs forcibly returned from Ninewa be relocated due to perceived affiliation with extremist groups. At 1:30 on 8 September, unknown actors opened fire against the north side of BAS camp. Cross-fire with security forces resulted in one soldier wounded and no other casualties reported. Camp management partners tracking local social media posts have reported a high number of threats against returning IDPs. Following the security incidents and continued threats, 135 IDP HHs residing in BAS before the forced return of IDPs from Ninewa left the camp due to fears for their security, and desire not to be affiliated with the newly arrived families. However, at least 6 HHs who had departed BAS have returned as they could not find alternative shelter in Al Shirqat district and reported community members suspect them of affiliation with the newly arrived IDPs from Ninewa camps. On 2 September, Salah al-Din intelligence actors delivered two letters to BAS camp management. The first letter dated 2 September was issued by Salah al-Din MoMD to the Governor reporting that a judicial decision had been made to close the camp and to return the land to its original owners. The letter stated that the Salah al-Din Operation Command should move IDPs currently residing in BAS to an alternative location. The intelligence actors verbally communicated to camp management that the camp should close within the following 10 days, i.e. by 12 September. Subsequently, the local council in Al Shirqat posted a message on Facebook asking that BAS cease operations within 72 hours by 5 September. The second letter, issued by the JCMC to the Salah al-Din MoMD, was dated 8 August and indicated that BAS should remain open until further notice due to constraints facing IDPs, including inability to return to their areas of origin. The letter also stated that the camp management agency was not responsible for the construction of the camp. Consequently, the delivery of these two letters has resulted in confusion among humanitarian actors in BAS that remains unresolved as of 8 September. The 2 September convoy from Hajj Ali camp did not reach AK camp until shortly after midnight on 3 September. Humanitarian actors were notified in the evening on 2 September, 30 minutes before the expected arrival of IDPs at AK camp, of a protest outside the camp’s gates reportedly consisting of sheikhs, mukhtars and community members from Tikrit city demanding that the convoy not be allowed into the camp due to IDPs’ perceived affiliations with extremist groups. ISF and PMU forces engaged in dialogue with the protestors and Salah al-Din Operations Command redirected the busses to the Operations Command base in Tikrit city. Protestors reportedly threw stones at the busses breaking some windows. Humanitarian actors also reported not being allowed access to the camp to receive the convoy due to security concerns. At 1:15 on 3 September, the convoy arrived at AK camp – about 12 hours after its departure from Hajj Ali. Security forces conducted security screenings for all new arrivals at AK’s main gate, with MoMD stating that IDPs who cleared security would be sent back to their areas of origin. As of 8 September, forcibly returned IDPs from Ninewa in AK camp
who successfully completed the security screening have not been allowed to depart the camp. One male IDP was arrested during the screening process. Due to the lack of timely information regarding the convoy’s destination, humanitarian actors in AK camp did not have sufficient resources on hand for the new arrivals. On 4 September, the Salah al-Din MoMD distributed 135 food baskets and kitchen sets following a one-day period in which IDPs had access only to water and refreshments provided by humanitarian actors. However, regular food assistance, safe drinking water and shelter remain a concern. For the first two days following their arrival, some IDPs were forced to sleep outside following the Salah al-Din Directorate of Education’s refusal to allow families to sleep in a nearby school. As of 6 September, 100 tents became available due to departures of IDPs residing in AK prior to the arrival of families from Ninewa. Protection partners reported that IDPs residing in AK camp before the forced return of IDPs from Nineewa felt apprehension at being linked to the arrivals from Nineewa, and consequently decided to leave the camp. On 2 September, security actors confiscated the civil documentation of 263 HHs as pressure tactics to force families to leave the camp to provide enough space for the Nineewa arrivals. Humanitarian actors reported that documents are returned only upon departure. As of 4 September, 107 HHs left the camp with most indicating they would return to Bajji district and Al Sinija sub-district; this includes seven HHs forcibly returned from Nineewa who do not have perceived affiliation with extremist groups. Movement restrictions remain for families arriving in convoys from Nineewa who are perceived by community members and IDPs residing in AK camp prior to their arrival to have affiliation to extremists. However, these HHs remained unsegmented within the camp. The convoy from Hajj Ali to Leylan 2 camp departed 5 September at 17:00 and arrived at 9:45 on 6 September. Lack of coordination between security actors made for long wait periods at check points. As a result, the convoy spent most of the night at the Hamreen checkpoint between Tikrit district and Kirkuk Governorate. Most arrivals were children and reported exhaustion following the 16-hour journey with limited access to food and WASH facilities. Upon arrival, the ISF instructed IDPs to queue in front of the camp’s main gate to undergo security screening. As IDPs waited outside in the sun to be screened, and as the process did not give priority to the elderly or persons with medical issues, six IDPs fainted while waiting and had to be provided first aid. Camp management eventually succeeded in negotiations with security actors to allow IDPs to wait in the camp community centre. IDPs were provided with refreshments, critical relief items and food assistance. Four IDPs were arrested. Following the above incidents of forced returns, and reported challenges related to transport and reception conditions, IDPs originating outside of Nineewa residing in Qayarah Jed‘ah and Airstrip camps in Nineewa governorate have increasingly requested to depart camps. Similar to the response in HAA camps 1 & 2, 2 local police instructed the camp manager in Qayarah Jed‘ah 5 to stop issuing departure letters and to prevent IDPs originating from outside of Nineewa from leaving the camps. According to humanitarian actors, over 50 families have expressed intent to leave the camp without departure letters, fearing the consequences of forced returns. In Airstrip camp, humanitarian actors reported that some IDPs from other governorates (no estimates provided) were impedied from crossing checkpoints after leaving the camps. In particular, IDPs originating from Hawiga (Kirkuk) and Al-Shirqat (Salah al-Din) districts continue to express concerns to humanitarian actors for their safety if forcibly returned. As previously highlighted, without departure letters, IDPs may be impeded from crossing checkpoints, obtaining security clearances in areas of origin, and possibly denied access to MoMD return grants. No restriction of movement has been reported for IDPs originating from Nineewa leaving camps. Concerns that these movements could lead to reciprocal forced returns of IDPs from Nineewa currently residing in other governorates have been confirmed as the Governor of Kirkuk has announced plans for future movement. No details of have been provided, but the Governor pledged to carry out movements in coordination with Nineewa authorities and in an organized manner. Forced returns, together with security screenings in four Nineewa camps, have led to the arrival of IDP families in East Mosul camps (Khazer, Hassansham U2 and Hassansham U3). Arrivals to East Mosul camps was relatively stable in 2019, but began to pick up in July and August – coinciding with security screenings and forced movements in Nineewa Governorate camps. Currently, the number of arrivals stands higher than departures for the first time since mid-2017. Amongst the arrivals, 34 HHs (170 individuals, including 13 FHHs) originally from Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorates have left Salamiyah, HAA and Qayarah Jed‘ah camps reportedly due to fear of forced returns and/or mistreatment during security screenings. Some of the families reported not informing camp management (and departed without a departure letter), fearing restriction of movement. They have also reported challenges in crossing checkpoints, particularly those controlled by PMF forces. It is expected that more families may re-displace to East Mosul and contingency preparations are currently being put in place. There are currently about 700 empty plots in Hassansham U2 and U3 camps.
2b. Strategic Update from C/S PWG

Anbar

- **Forced returns from Hammam Al-Alil (HAA) 1 & 2 camps to Anbar on 23 August**: Protection partners provided assistance and monitoring of 36 HHs forcibly returned to Anbar from Ninewa. Initial indication from authorities, including Ninewa Operations Command, was that HHs would be allowed to enter HTC camp in Anbar. Upon crossing the border into Anbar Governorate, the Anbar Operations Command informed IDPs they would be taken to their areas of origin. A majority of HHs were not allowed to enter at the district and/or sub-district level and have since gone into secondary displacement. The Anbar PWG continues to monitor their movements and to advocate on their behalf.

- **Voluntary returns from AAF camp to Al Qa’im 24-28 September**: Partners continue to provide protection monitoring and assistance for HHs who have voluntarily departed from AAF camp to their areas of origin in Al Qa’im. IDPs report that returns have been voluntary, and that HHs deciding to return have been provided with 500,000 IQD as a gift from the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Mohamed al-Halbousi. This follows al-Halbousi’s visit to AAF camp in September with the SRSG.

- **GRC Mission to Al Qa’im**: On 25 September an inter-agency mission composed of Anbar GRC members and observers (IOM, UIMS, IRC, UNICEF, Anbar Protection Working Group, Returns Working Group, OCHA and focal points form the MoMD Anbar Branch, JCMC and the Anbar Governor’s Office) met with stakeholders in Al Qa’im, including the coordination focal point from the Mayor’s office; members of the local council; and tribal leaders (sheikhs and mukhtars). Participants also conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with male and female returnees.

- **Anbar ICCG-led discussion on solutions for returnees**: At the Anbar ICCG meeting in September in Ramadi, the Returns Working Group presented an overview of displacement and returns in Anbar. The proposed way forward was to create a durable solutions framework based on the current plan for Ninewa. ICCG members decided this activity would fall under the auspices of the Anbar ICCG. A brainstorming meeting involving key stakeholders, including development actors, will take place in Baghdad on 15 October.

Kirkuk

- **Kirkuk has experienced five movements of forced returns from Ninewa camps as of 28 August**:
  - HAA 1 & 2 camps to Leylan 1 camp on 28 August
  - Hajj Ali camp to Leylan 2 camp on 5 September
  - Hajj Ali to Leylan 2 camp on 11 September
  - Jeddah 5 camp to Leylan 1 camp on 14 September
  - Airstrip and Jeddah camps to Leylan 1 camp on 19 September

- **Kirkuk PWG members continue to monitor forcibly relocated IDPs in Leylan 1 and 2 camps. Partners report that HHs were screened upon departure from Ninewa and were re-screened upon entrance to Leylan 1 & 2. A number of IDPs have been arbitrarily detained and/or arrested upon their arrival to Leylan 1 & 2 camps. Security actors conducted screenings inside of the camps, violating civilian character of camp. In some cases, civil identification was confiscated. In advocacy with the local police, the protection actors have successfully advocated for the return of IDs for IDPs from the 28 August forced movement. Partners report that IDPs in Leylan 1 & 2 have access to the same freedom of movement and resources as the caseload residing in both camps previously.**

Salah al-Din

- **Salah al-Din has experienced 2 movements of forced returns from Ninewa camps, 1 voluntary movement from Ninewa to Al Karama camp and 1 forced movement from camp to camp within the governorate as of 31 August**:  
  - HAA 1 & 2 camps to Basateen Al Sheoukh on 31 August
  - Hajj Ali to Al Karama camp on 2 September
  - Basateen Al Sheoukh to Al Karama camp between 10-14 September
  - Airstrip camp to Al Karama on 2 October

- **The Salah al-Din PWG reports that a majority of IDPs are women, children and vulnerable persons. As in Kirkuk, IDPs underwent a second round of security screening upon entry to Salah al-Din camps, which has resulted in arbitrary detention and arrests. The forced movements have been met with hostility from local community members and leaders in both Al Shirqat district and Tikrit district. Three sound grenades were thrown over the fence into Basateen camp with no casualties or damage to infrastructure; there was also one incident of a community member opening fire into the camp and wounding a local police offer. In Tikrit district, a protest of over 150 sheikhs and mukhtars blocked the arrival of the convoy from Hajj Ali to Al Karama.**

- **As of the 2 October GRC in Tikrit, due to existing land ownership issues, the Governor announced Basateen would close by 15 October. Protection actors are working with CCCM partners to obtain the intentions of IDPs departing as means to shift the response to out-of-camp.**
• As of 9 October, all IDPs forcibly relocated from Ninewa camps with a perceived affiliation have been consolidated into Al Karama camp. The camp suffers from lack of services, including acute health and shelter needs. IDPs do not have access to freedom of movement except for emergency health care, and have had their civil IDs confiscated upon arrival. ICCG members shared a position paper on the humanitarian characteristics of Al Karama camp with the HCT on 8 October wherein ICCG members reported that the conditions in Al Karama camp are in line with the international definition of detention as articulated by the ICRC. Until the Government of Salah al-Din begins to implement a sponsorship program and to provide a timeline for how IDPs unable to obtain sponsorship may gain access to freedom of movement, clusters are prepared to offer minimum level assistance.

• As of early September, al-Qadissiyah Complex has been decommissioned and closed following a series of forced evictions by local authorities. Al Alam camp has also been decommissioned and closed.

• A significant number of IDPs originating from Salah al-Din continue to experience displacement in Ninewa and in Kirkuk. It is unclear when these HHs will be returned to the governorate.

Diyala

• The 29 August GRC meeting was cancelled until further notice. This meeting was to serve as a discussion forum for the potential closure of Sa’ad camp, including offering of potential solutions for IDPs living in Sa’ad as presented by clusters and key stakeholders. A new date has not been announced.

2c. Thematic Update from GBV Sub-Cluster

• CASI Mission: Caring for child and adolescent survivors of violence (CASI) mission to Iraq in September 2019 to support rollout of CP GBV guidance note on case management coordination. The overall objective of CASI is to improve the quality of and access to services for child and adolescent survivors of sexual abuse in emergencies. The workshop held on 9th September in Ninewa explored the possible rollout for CP GBV guide note for case management coordination. The outcome of the workshop is the joint agreement between CP and GBV case management actors in Ninewa on enhancing care to child and adolescent survivors. CASI will be piloted in two locations of Ninewa after finalization of the guidance note. The GBV and CP Sub Clusters will discuss the next steps on the training on case management and coordination.

• IHF Second Standard Allocation: The objective of the IHF Second Standard Allocation for the GBV Sub Cluster is to fill the gaps in unmet needs from the 2019 HRP as identified in the PMR. Case management and capacity development were identified as the biggest unmet needs. The GBV SC SAG reviewed the five projects submitted to the GBV Sub Cluster, out of which four projects were recommended for approval with some suggested modifications. The selected projects amounting to USD 1.8 million will target prioritized areas in Kirkuk (Laylan camps, Markaz Kirkuk, Markaz Daquq); Ninewa (Al Qayara & Hamam al Alil camps, Markaz al-Hamdaniya, Namrud, and Bartela); Diyala (Khanaqin, Ba`quba (Saad Camp), Al-Khalis); Salah Al-Din (Balad, Tuz, Baiji) and will focus on specialized GBV case management, PSS, and capacity development.

• Gaps in GBV Services: A number of GBV service providers are experiencing funding constraints following closure of WCCs; accordingly there are gaps in GBV services. The IHF Second Standard Allocation funds will cover the needs in the above high priority areas where there are gaps in GBV services.

• GBVIMS Trends: Following a request for presentation on the GBVIMS trends, the GBVIMS TF will present the trends from the GBVIMS data during the Protection Cluster meeting of October.

AP: GBV SC to present GBVIMS trends in the NPC meeting in October.

2d. Thematic Update from Child Protection Sub-Cluster

• The inter-agency Child Safeguarding consultant Hannah Cattermole (contributed by TdH It) conducted the assessment on the current practices related to Child Safeguarding. She received 29 responses on the survey and interviewed 23 organizations, mainly national partners. From the report, 68% of the agencies has a policy, but only 21% of the agencies implement the policy. Based on the result, CPSC is currently developing the Implementation guide, and the 3 training (Erbil, Baghdad, Basra) will be rolled out to familiarize members for this implementation guide. For Erbil, CPSC received overwhelming number of applications for Erbil, which we are discussing with NCCI to host another round to accommodate the wider participants. After Hannah’s departure in mid Nov, there will be 3-4 resource persons to be able to roll out the Child Safeguarding training.

• CPIMS+ pilot phase in Dohuk will conclude in 30 Sep. The User evaluation took place, and the future roll out for KRI will be based on this evaluation and recommendation. The KRI roll out will be done in the new project phase which will commence later in this year.

• CP sub-cluster Co-coordinator Jeannette Poules needed to depart at the end of August due to the financial constraints of the co-coordinating agency (SCI). CPSC would like to sincerely thank her for the contributions she made. The surge capacity is under mobilization, but meanwhile the coordination capacity is going low, please
expect sluggish response from CPSC team.

2e. Thematic Update from Mine Action Sub-Cluster

- Two NGOs joined the MASC (HAMMAP and Shareteah Humanitarian Organization) HAMMAP is a French NGO and registered in Kurdistan but not yet in Baghdad. Shareteah is a national NGO conducting RE registered in federal Iraq and Kurdistan. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) opened its Regional Mine Action Center – North in Mosul, to manage and coordinate the ERW clearance operations in Ninawa governorate.
- **Access:** One access issue was reported by one of the MASC members (HALO Trust) in Beiji on 25 and 26 August. UNMAS also experienced an access issues near Talafar on Monday 23 September which resulted in mission cancelation.
- **Accreditation:** Danish Demining Group which was on stand- down since April because of re-registration issues with DNGO, resumed its activities after being informed through DMA/ Baghdad that they were granted permission by the DNGO to conduct operations up to the end of November 2019 pending the submissions required from Head Office in Copenhagen.

2f. Thematic Update from HLP Sub-Cluster

- As result of high advocacy carried out by HLP SC and HLP partners with Central and governorate compensation committees in Iraq, many of the recommendations provided by HLP Sub-cluster and Ttdpk have been incorporated to the amendment of the law on compensation. The Council of Representatives of Iraqi Parliament already received the recommendations and the first reading of the amendments took place on Sunday, 22 October 2018.
- In September, HLP SC in coordination with HLP partner Ttdpk organized the second (two days) workshop with Central and governorate Compensation Committees, Judges and Administrative Officials, to discuss issues and challenges related to Compensation procedures and to see possibilities to include further recommendations for the second reading of amendments of the law on compensation.
- HLP SC, together with UN-Habitat organized a two weeks training on mediation to resolve HLP disputes. This training aims to train 14 candidates (young women and men) and licence them to apply Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), particularly mediation mechanism approach, to resolve HLP disputes related to secondary occupations.
- HLP SC has been informed HLP partners that in Telafar, the Manager of the Compensation office is discriminating beneficiaries to submit and process compensation claims based religious and sectarian affiliation. In addition, the Manager is asking Evaluation Experts to visit only properties which belong to beneficiaries of particular sectarian group. HLP SC consider this as serious issue. These are considered discriminatory practices against beneficiaries who are in need to access equally HLP services to submit compensation claims for their damaged properties. HLP SC will follow up on this with different actors that operates in Ninewa to investigate further and address these discriminatory practices against beneficiaries. In addition, HLP SC will address this issue to Head of Ninewa compensation Sub-committee in Mosul.
- The HLP SC, together with Shelter Cluster, held a workshop on tenure security and challenges and how to address HLP related issues during Repairs of War Damaged Shelters (WDS) and Repair/rehabilitation and hosting arrangements.

2g. Strategic Update from CwC Task Force

- Based on recently endorsed HCT Protection Strategy, the current CwC TF will be dismantled and a new CwC/AAP TF will be formed and placed under the ICCG (rather than only under the NPC). OCHA and UNHCR will co-lead the new TF.

2h. Update from NPC

- **Update on HNO process and Joint Needs Analysis Workshop:** HNO process is ongoing; Clusters are drafting their chapters that will form the Sectorial Analysis of the HNO; on 19 September 2019, a Joint Needs Analysis workshop was organized to discuss humanitarian needs from different sources (MCNA, DTM, ILA IV, etc.). Outcomes of the workshop will be shared with HCT members for their endorsement. Based on new HNO/HRP forms, the HNO document will highlight four Humanitarian Consequences (Physical and Mental Well-Being, Living Standards, Protection – intended as Centrality of Protection, and Resilience and Recovery – for which no HRP response will be planned. Other frameworks currently operating in Iraq will be informed of the data emerging under this Consequence). The NPC is planning to organize Governorate level workshops with partners to validate identified protection related needs and plan the response (for HRP purposes). Dates of the workshops will be communicated with all partners once finalized. To date, there are still discussion on how the
HRP will be implemented (eg., whether through Project Module system or an alternative system). The NPC will inform partners in due course.

2i. Updates from RPA mechanism

- The final month of the project included an RPA in Asakra and Bani Waiss Villages, Sadiya sub-district, Diyala, with the topline findings of this RPA including HLP concerns, lack of access to services as well as lack of civil documentation. One of the biggest issues in these villages is the location of the village and the proximity to the Hamrin mountains, with the communities reporting regular attacks by so-called IS as well as highly contaminated farmland and fields around the villages.
- The RPA team want to pass on their thanks and appreciation for the last 3.5 years of this project – and we have worked really closely with many of the organisations in this room, and we wish you all the best as you continue with your programming.
- For any follow up questions relating to the RPA, it can be directed to the NPC.

3. AOB

   c. The next NPC meeting will be on 17 October from 11am to 1pm.