National Protection Cluster

Minutes of Meeting (15 November 2018)

Locations: UNHCR Baghdad, NCCI Erbil, plus Webex

Chaired by: Mohammed Khan (NPC Coordinator) and Claudia Nicoletti (NPC Coordinator)

1. Review of Action Points from 11 October meeting

2. Strategic & Thematic Updates:
   a. Strategic Update from KR-I PWG (10 mins)
   b. Strategic Update from C/S PWG (10 mins)
   c. Thematic Update from GBV Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   d. Thematic Update from Child Protection Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   e. Thematic Update from Mine Action Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   f. Thematic Update from Child Protection Sub-Cluster (10 mins)
   g. Strategic Update from CwC Task Force (10 mins)
   h. Update from NPC – Update on 2018/2019 IHF Standard Allocation (5 mins)
   i. Update from RPA mechanism (10 mins)

3. AOB (30 mins)
   a. Iraq Response Innovation Lab (IRIL) presentation
   b. UNHCR Research on Legal Assistance Service Monitoring for IDPs
   c. UNICEF Research on Birth Registration/Certificate
   d. NRC Internal Research on Documentation for Women and Children in Retaken Areas (Anbar, Ninewa and Kirkuk governorates)
   e. REACH Initiative presentation on Intentions Survey findings (postponed)

1. Review of Action Points from 11 October meeting

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<th>Action Points</th>
<th>Update/Follow-up</th>
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<td>CwC TF Coordinator to share material with partners on F2F communication modalities with beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
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Minutes adopted without amendments.

2a. Strategic Update from KRI & Ninewa PWG

People with perceived affiliation

- PWGs continue to identify human rights violations of those people and families with perceived affiliation to extremists groups. In East Mosul Camps under Erbil control, several IDP single women head of household have reported aggravated protection risks, including the challenges related to access documentation, fear to return to AoO due to risk of arbitrary detention, social exclusion and stigma, retaliation and denial of access to shelter and services if returned back. IDPs are increasingly reporting the request to renounce their families members affiliated to extremists groups. Partners reported similar requests for renouncing families members addressed to returnees in Zummar, Ninewa Governorate. According to reports, the local Intelligence Office instructed such families to immediately obtain security clearance, and letters issued by a court renouncing their family members with alleged links to extremists, or face eviction to camps. During a meeting with humanitarian actors, local authorities indicated that any renouncing process was voluntary and meant to protect families themselves from future allegations of links with extremists. Humanitarian actors have advocated for the upholding of individual criminal responsibility. There is no guarantee that the renunciation process would afford them physical or legal protection to individuals. Local leaders reported that some of these families, who had already completed the renunciation process, were still evicted from their areas of origin, and relocated to camps.

Lack of services in camps

- Last week, the JCC (Joint Crisis Coordination Center) in Sulaymaniyah issued a letter requesting Camp Management to suspend the admission of IDPs to Ashti, Arbat, Surdash, Tazade and Qorato camps. The decision states that it is based on the lack of humanitarian services in camps and withdrawal of many organizations from the governorate and “lack of proper support to JCC to deliver humanitarian assistance”. Following initial advocacy, authorities agree to admit vulnerable cases to the camps. Humanitarian actors
continue to advocate with the Governor’s office to revert completely the decision, and believe that advocacy will be successful.

2b. Strategic Update from C/S PWG

- **Baghdad/Anbar: Threats of forced relocation in Baghdad:** On 9 October, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) Khakh branch informed camp management in Al Wahda Camp [currently hosting 28 families] in Baghdad that the camp would be closed within one week. IDPs were informed they would be given the option of either returning to their areas of origin or being relocated to Al-Ahlan camp in Abu Ghraib, Baghdad. Most families living in the camp are from Al Qa’im district, in Western Anbar. Families from Al Qa’im reported that they are afraid to return to their area of origin and would also feel unsafe in camps in Abu Ghraib. The available space in Al Ahlan would also have been insufficient to accommodate all families. Protection and CCCM partners closely monitored the situation and conducted direct advocacy with the MoDM regarding postponing the evictions till the end of the school year (February) or alternative solutions had been identified. The NPC also submitted an Advocacy Brief to the HCT. The evictions were not enforced and informal feedback by MoDM suggests that they will be delayed till February.

The Baghdad GRC was activated in mid-September through an order by the Governor of Baghdad and on 7 November, a first meeting took place. Aside from humanitarian representatives, it was attended by the Senior Engineer, delegated to manage IDPs and Camps, from the Governor’s Office. Humanitarian partners see the attendance of senior government officials from all relevant government agencies, including MoDM and the Baghdad Operations Command, as an important step to ensure concrete outcomes to GRC meetings and are planning advocacy in this regard.

*Forced relocation of IDPs with perceived affiliation to extremists:* On 13 October, 11 families originating from Saqlawiyah were forcibly relocated from one of Bezabize’s informal sites to AAF. The forced relocation was reportedly implemented by authorities, following the arrest of two members of these families due to alleged affiliation to extremists. Security forces confiscated the identity documents (IDs) of all the members after they arrived in AAF camps, and reportedly refused to provide them with camp resident cards (security cards). Due to freedom of movement restrictions in AAF, IDPs are required to leave IDs at the exit check point; without their IDs, those families are prohibited from leaving the camp.

*Camp closures in Anbar:* The Anbar Operations Command (AOC) has repeatedly communicated plans to close Kilo 18 camp, but have not shared fixed dates with humanitarian actors or IDPs themselves. In addition, inconsistent information regarding alternative options for IDPs unable or unwilling to return has been reported. Plans for the consolidation of three camp were also reported in HTC, though as in the case of Kilo 18, no formal communication was issued by authorities. On 6 November, during an AAF Local Council meeting it was announced that both the formal and informal Bezabiz camps [currently hosting 2,024 families / 12,144 individuals] are to be closed. Based on the meeting minutes, IDPs are to be relocated to AAF central camps “to control their security”. AAF camp management were informed that they should expect the IDPs to arrive in the camp during the current week. More recent information from Bezabiz camp management indicates that only families in informal Bezabiz camps (1,300 - 1,500 families) will be relocated, and that the relocation is expected to take place before the end of the year. No Anbar GRC meeting has taken place since mid-July, despite extensive advocacy.

*Denied returns:* 10 families living in Kilo 18, originating from Abu Taebs in Ramadi district were in early November visited by a general from AOC and a tribal leader from their area of origin who guaranteed their safe return. The families had not returned previously due to tribal issues. Based on this assurance, the families on 9 November signed a document indicating they are returning voluntary and departed the camp. Two of the families were able to return to their areas of origin while two returned to Baghdad. For five of the families, only children and the wives were allowed to return, while the men were forced to move to Al Ta’meem neighborhood in Ramadi. Families in Ramadi are often asked to provide sponsorship of 10 individuals from their area of origin in order to be allowed to return.

*Threats of forced return of IDPs from Al-Hussay village residing in AAF camps in Anbar:* In late October, following an IED explosion in AAF city, protection partners reported rumors about proposed forced relocations or returns of IDPs from Al-Hussay village – located south-west of Fallujah city – following the arrest of a man from the village who was believed to be implicated in the attack. On 7 November, security checks of families originating from Al-Hussay residing in AAF camps were reported, and their movement in the camp was severely restricted, including that of IDPs with medical referral forms. On 8 November, a prominent tribal leader from Al-Hussay visited Fallujah 10 camp inside AAF, and informed 91 families originating from Al-Hussay that they should return, otherwise they would be forced to do so by the Anbar Operations Command (AOC) and their belongings would be removed from the camp. The 91 families – 89 of which are female-headed households (at least 10 of whom are perceived to be affiliated to extremists) – indicated that they fear returning as they may be targeted for...
collective punishment, and expressed the same to the tribal leader, resulting in an argument. On 11 November, members of the AOC visited Fallujah 10 camp and interviewed the families but did not mention plans for forced returns. On 15 November, AOC and approximately 9 representatives/leaders from Al Hussay and multiple armed military personnel and vehicles met with IDPs in Fallujah 10 camp to encourage them to return. 36 FHHs later were reported to have registered to return though humanitarian partners shared that some of the women seemed distressed. Two families have relocated to another AAF camp as they were afraid to be forced to return. Multiple protection partners are supporting the closely monitoring the situation. On 8-9 and 15 November, OCHA contacted the office of the Anbar Governor and JCMC Anbar to raise concerns around forced return threats.

**Freedom of movement restrictions in Anbar camps:** Restriction in Kilo 18 and AAF camp persist. In Kilo 18 camp in addition to requiring legal documents and a sponsor, IDPs reported that only some but not all family members can leave the camp at any given time. In HTC temporary movement restriction were imposed between 3 and 11 November as screening of IDPs in the camp were ongoing.

Humanitarian partners continue to monitor the situation in Anbar, and engage in bi-lateral advocacy with authorities but increasingly also reached out to donors and other international actors for additional support. The UNHCR Representatives' has also conducted a mission to Kilo 18 and met members of the Provincial Council and Governor of Anbar (14 November) and highlighted recent protection issues in both meetings.

- **Salah al-Din:** **Al-Shahama camp closure process:** During October, 18 families had been relocated to Al-Karama camp or two return to Anbar. On 23 October, 4 families / 8 individuals – originating from Fallujah - were forcibly relocated to Al-Shahama camp by the ISF, after three male family members were arrested by Tikrit police due to perceived affiliation.

On 3 November, 19 additional families from Shirqat, Balad and Baiji districts in Salah al-Din governorate, and Mosul district in Ninewa governorate were relocated to Qayyarah Airstrip camp in Ninewa. This movement included the four families who had been brought to Al-Shahama on 23 October. Police in Airstrip camp were given a letter by the Salah al-Din Police which refers to the relocated IDPs as “family members of ISIS terrorist cell”. Not all seized ID documents were given back to this group of IDPs; only the heads of households received their IDs. Moreover, they did not receive departure letters from Al-Shahama camp management. Without ID documents and departure letters the freedom of movement of these families will be restricted in Airstrip camp. Three of the relocated families in the Airstrip camp have indicated that they feel unsafe and want to depart the camp, for which they will need the approval of the local police. On 3 November, 16 families transferred to Al-Karama camp, and 4 families were relocated to Basateen Al-Shoyouk camp in Shirqat district, Salah al-Din. Camp management in Basateen was presented by police with the same letter labelling these families as “family members of ISIS terrorist cell”. However, their IDs and phones were returned to them.

On 3 November, 12 families were given permission to return to their areas of origin – in Shirqat, Balad, Baiji districts and Baghdad (Al-Yousafeyah area). However, four families decided to relocate to Al Karama camp instead as they did not feel safe to return to their areas of origin. An additional four families who had attempted to return to Shirqat and Yathrib were later also re-displaced to Al-Karama camp. The IDPs remaining in Al-Shahama are expected to be relocated to Laylan camp in Kirkuk, camps in Anbar (likely Ameriyat al-Fallujah [AAF] camps), or to return to their areas of origin, but have not been provided information about and an opportunity to choose their destination camps, or information about relocation dates.

Protection concerns were raised by the UNHCR Representative and partners during meetings with the Governor of Salah al-Din on 6 November; and the specific issue of police letters identifying relocated families as ISIS affiliated were raised with the Salah al-Din Operations Command (SOC). The Governor and SOC committed to instruct police to refrain from labelling IDPs relocated from Al-Shahama to other camps as “family member of ISIS”; and to release a correction letter stipulating that affected families have received clearance, and are not subject to any security charges. The Governor further committed to instruct Al-Shahama camp management to issue departure letters to all families leaving the camp; and to instruct police/security actors to return all seized ID documents to IDPs departing from Al-Shahama camp. Humanitarian actors continue to monitor whether these commitments have been implemented in practice.

**Threats of forced return of IDPs in Al-Karama camp in Salah al-Din to their areas of origin in other governorates:**

On 7 November, SOC visited Al-Karama camp [currently hosting 490 families / 2,398 individuals] and interviewed IDP families originating from other governorates. Protection partners inquired about the reasons for the interviews, and were informed by SOC staff that they had been instructed that all IDP families not originating from Salah al-Din should return to their areas of origin. IDPs were instructed that they should prepare to return during the week of 11-17 November. Between 10 and 12 November, 5 families (27 individuals) left Al-Karama to return to Hawiga district in Kirkuk governorate. Seven families from Hawiga, two families from Mosul district in Ninewa governorate, and two families from Baghdad governorate presently reside in Al-Karama camp. Two
female-headed households from Hawiga will be exempt as the heads of households are widows, their houses have been destroyed, and they are working for a local NGO in the camp.

2c. Thematic Update from GBV Sub-Cluster

- Coordination and preparation for 16 days of activism is ongoing by the different GBV WGs in the different governorates. For instance, the Central South GBV has set up a taskforce on the harmonized IEC materials for 16 days. The opening ceremonies for Sulaymaniyah and Erbil will be conducted on 25th November.
- In Central South, GBV partners continued to respond to IDPs through mobile teams and static centers in camps and out-of-camp locations in a coordinated way by conducting safety audits as part of risk mitigation and by providing psychological first aid, PSS and GBV case management. Recreational activities were also organized as entry points to these services.
- Camp consolidation/closure process is ongoing in Anbar, Baghdad and Salah al-Din. GBV partners are closely monitoring the situation together with protection partners so that this will not lead to forced eviction/return.
- Half of IDPs in Shahama camp was relocated, and only about 40 families are remaining. The local government plans to close the camp totally, but the exact timing is not clear yet.
- Restrictions of movement, especially for the families with perceived links with ISIL, continue in Anbar camps.

Achievements/ Response

- Discussion was held with Protection Cluster on the issue of limited access to basic services, including GBV services, for women with perceived affiliation with ISIL in the camps of Anbar and SAD. It was agreed to conduct high-level advocacy as well as to ensure availability of humanitarian response, especially through mobile team, to address this. GBV actors in Kilo 18, AAF, and Shahama camp will continue to monitor the situation closely, provide required GBV services and update the WG on regular basis.
- Child Survivor Initiative: GBV referral pathways of 11 locations in SAD and Anbar were updated to include information for child survivors. The guide note for GBV and CP actors to support child survivors is also being finalized.
- Extensive awareness-raising activities were organized targeting communities in Central-South, including community/religious leaders, on women’s role in society, how to change negative social norms, sexual abuse, child marriage, education for girls, etc.
- Following a meeting with JCCC in May 2018 regarding concerns the Sulaymaniyah GBV WG had over camp managements’ handling and response to GBV cases, UNFPA has conducted GBV core concepts and guiding principles training for targeted stakeholders. Additionally, the Sulaymaniyah GBV WG drafted a guidance note for camp management on how to respond to GBV survivors, including a survivor centered approach, referral, etc. GBV WG will work on finalizing the guidance note, before translation into Kurdish and Arabic.
- Following the roll out of the GBV-SOP in Sulaymaniyah and a series of trainings for front line service providers, a review workshop was conducted to understand implementation of the GBV SOP for NGOs and government stakeholders, both of whom shared challenges, and highlighted the strength of and areas for improvement for the SOPs.
- As part of the preparedness plan for Qandil operations, the Sulaymaniyah GBV WG has shared with OCHA a list of response activities it could implement, including distribution of dignity kits, deployment of GBV mobile team, case management, awareness, PSS, etc.
- It its efforts to track progress of PSEA training across all NGOs in Sulaymaniyah, the GBVSWG have been able to capture major progress through a monitoring tool for PSEA training in Sulaymaniyah. GBVSWG member CDO report that 100% of their staff members have been trained on PSEA, parallel to which they have integrated PSEA into their organisation’s policy.
- GBV WG in Kirkuk is still in the process of developing the GBV referral pathway for Hawija district.
- A new partner ZHO (Zhiyan Health Organization) initiated provision of GBV services in Al Hawija

Needs/ Gaps

- Restriction on access to services as well as case referrals to outside camps, especially for the families with perceived affiliation with ISIL.
- Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse in Anbar camps, but women/service providers would not like to report due to fear and social stigma. GBV team is monitoring the situation and providing needed services to the survivors.
- Limited number of psychiatrists available to provide specialized MHPSS service (West Anbar).
- Limited livelihood support and legal support for GBV survivors
- Very limited number of organizations working on GBV in Basra.
- Lack of GBV interventions in Makhmur district.
There continues to be a need for capacity building for government stakeholders on GBV response in Sulaymaniyah.

A growing number of organizations in Sulaymaniyah reported shortage of funding whilst the humanitarian needs persist.

Need for dignity kits in Dohuk.

2d. Thematic Update from Child Protection Sub-Cluster

- **Structured PSS**: SCI with support from CPSC have organized two ToTs on youth resilience (7th to 11th October) and child resilience (14th to 18th October). Approximately 40 participants were selected. Another ToT specific for the Central South is planned for later 2018 or early 2019.

- **Continuation of the rollout of the Child Protection Minimum Standards - CPMS**: Final rollout of the CPMS was conducted in Sulaymaniyah (on 3rd and 4th October). The recommendations from the CPMS rollout workshops will contribute to the revisions of the global CPMS.

- The newly introduced **Child Protection Information Management System (CPIMS+) Primero** is being piloted in Dohuk. Two local NGOs, two international NGOs and a GoI institution – MoLSA have been identified as the piloting agencies. The system is still under trial by the partners and is expected to be fully functional in December. A technical visit by CPIMS experts (facilitated by UNICEF) is planned for the month of October. These experts will help to establish the system.

- **The Child Survivors’ Initiative – CSI**: a joint CP and GBV initiative. A technical visit by the CSI coordinator to Iraq to support the coordination and capacity building initiatives for the partners, as follow up action for the CSS ToT is planned for October. The process to strengthen and coordinate the CSS referral pathway was strengthened by the identification and allocation of referral pathway focal points in SAD and Anbar. *I suppose the GBV SC colleagues have additions to this topic.*

2e. Thematic Update from Mine Action Sub-Cluster

- **MA AoR** - Iraq MA AoR has elected a Co-Coordinator in line with the IASC Guidelines and Reference Module for Coordination at Country Level and the NPC. On 14 November the Co-Lead was endorsed by the MA AoR Membership. The Co-Lead is NPA, her name is Lubna Sabeeh and her contact details will be circulated in due time.

- **Access** - MA AoR has been made aware that a number of partners have been denied access through certain check-points or have had access to certain areas of operations denied or suspended by third party armed actors and/or civilian local authorities/government officials. We would like to raise serious concern for such obstruction of humanitarian activities and request the PC, OCHA, and/or HCT to look into possible solutions to the situation.

- **Visa and Accreditation** - A number of the HMA INGO partners are still facing challenges with visas. INGO staff are waiting for visas for months which in turn has an inevitable impact on operations and is negatively affecting humanitarian mine action activities and thus the people in need of HMA response.

- **Explosives, ISF and response** - In Federal Iraq, MA organizations can only render items safe or move safe items. MA organisations cannot ‘destroy’ anything, the ISF is still only one that can do this. The situation remains unchanged until today. This means that even if a MA org responds, if the item is deemed unsafe to move, a MA partner has to wait for the ISF to come and take the process further. The efforts to provide specialised equipment other than explosives to facilitate activities of HMA operators continue.

- **Reporting of Explosive Hazards by UN Cluster and Sub-Cluster Members and UN Agencies** - Soon the link to the UNMAS online EH reporting form will be embedded in the NCCI website front page, for ease of finding. The link below is to be used for reporting the sighting of explosive hazards or suspected explosive hazards in liberated areas, this includes explosive remnants of war (ERW), landmines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The form is self-explanatory and is available in English and Arabic. [http://bit.ly/TaskRequestForm](http://bit.ly/TaskRequestForm). Once submitted, the form comes directly to UNMAS and contact will be made with the originator (if details are available) after which actions and processes will be explained. This is done in coordination with the Directorate of Mine Action and completion reports are shared to the national database. **Non-UN/non-cluster please phone the national mine action hotline ‘182’ or the Civil Defense Force ‘115’.** Reminder to all: *Do not approach or touch suspected explosive hazards!*

- **Maps and Clearance** - MA AoR receives inquiries on a daily basis regarding contamination maps and cleared areas. Please be reminded that maps only show known hazards. If explosive contamination maps do not show a hazard, it does not mean it is safe. Therefore, the MA AoR urges humanitarian partners to take this into account and refrain from further distribution of the contamination maps to the local population. Please also be
reminded that Iraq is one of the world’s most contaminated countries and with such vast EH contamination the MA sector would like to kindly advise all humanitarian partners to take into account mine action activities in planning their own humanitarian response, as Mine Action acts as an inevitable and life-saving enabler for all.

- **Risk Education** - Community Resource Centres serve as a space for information relevant to mine action and are able to provide contact details to relevant national emergency hotlines, such as DMA and Civil Defence, to the Mine Action Sub Cluster and through RE information dissemination via leaflets, posters, and other means, as well as they serve as a space for conducting sessions by adequately registered MA organisations. Additionally, UNMAS regularly organises Explosive Hazard (EH) Awareness Training for Humanitarian Workers. For more information on this please contact UNMAS RE Consultant, Celine Cheng or the MA AoR. Additional information will be circulated through the meeting minutes.

2f. **Thematic Update from HLP Sub-Cluster**
- HLP SC started to work on the strategy and various HLP approaches for 2019. Meetings were held meeting with partners to understand more on the obstacles and challenges that faced in the field related to HLP;
- HLP SC collaborated and supported partners with issues related to the new OPS and GAM tool. Many meetings have been held with partners bilaterally to address their concerns;
- Due Diligence Guidelines translated in Arabic language and will be shared soon with partners;
- HLP SC in collaboration with the Global HLP, Shelter AORs and NRC, will be holding a two days training on “Securing Tenure in Shelter Operations” on 3rd and 4th of December. On 3rd of December training will be held for HLP, Shelter and CCCM SAG members, while on 4th of December training will be delivered to HLP, Shelter and CCCM partners.

2g. **Strategic Update from CwC Task Force**
- The KBYG Messeging: CwC supported the rollout of the KBYG messeging in Duhok by facilitating a ToT session with Dohuk Protection Working Group and CwC Taskforce. Currently the dissection is going on for another session in Erbil and Sulymanyah.
- CwC is supporting CRCs in Mousil through an AAP/CwC training as part of Ninewa Protection Working Group’s support to CRCs staff capacity building. KBYG messaging will be included as well.
- CWC supported the IDP Call Centre in increasing its visibility and outreach, especially in Central/South Iraq.
- Winterisation info package is currently being reviewed by CwC partners prior to dissemination.

2h. **Update from NPC**
- **Update on 2018/2019 IHF Standard Allocation** – the 2019 1st Standard Allocation will be launched in the coming days. The NPC SAG will be convened to discuss the criteria for evaluation of project proposals. As per the previous Allocations, the NPC won’t allow UN agencies to apply for funding. Additional criteria will be discussed with SAG members; the Allocation paper will be shared with partners once finalized from OCHA side.

2i. **Updates from RPA mechanism**

Recent RPAs:
- **Karma, Anbar**
  - Main findings: The main protection concerns in Karma town relate to the lack of livelihood opportunities, which impact negatively on families, in particular for female headed households. Restrictions of movement were cited as additional concerns, based on perceived fear and threats of detention or confiscation of identification at the multiple checkpoints that are present throughout Karma town.
- **East Farhatiya, Salah al Din**
  - The main protection concerns in east Farhatiya relate to the area of origin not being fit for returns, such as lack of access to basic services, limited or no livelihood opportunities, HLP and civil documentation issues, and restrictions of movement related to community tensions.
- **RPA team are on their way back from an RPA in three villages in Sinuni sub-district.**
  - The RPA was conducted in villages of recently returned Sunni Arab communities. The returned communities are living in dire conditions, residing in destroyed (unsafe) shelters, no basic services (healthcare, water, electricity, schools, food items, and NFIs), no livelihood opportunities, and personal safety fears and concerns, related to social tensions and presence of armed actors.

Possible upcoming RPAs include:
- **Areas of return in northern Ninewa**
- **Western Anbar**
- Hawija
- Areas of return in Salah al-Din.

3. AOB
a. Iraq Response Innovation Lab (IRIL) presentation - Iraq Response Innovation Lab Manager gave a presentation on the IRIL. The objective of the Lab is to improve and transform how response, early recovery, and resilience building is carried out in Iraq by supporting innovations to solve locally-identified challenges. Link to the Prezi presentation can be found here (https://prezi.com/view/uzciOa9ZTx7IGkY5dBJZ/). Questions and clarifications on the IRIL can be addressed to Nathalie Rami at NRami@oxfam.org.uk.

b. UNHCR Research on Legal Assistance Service Monitoring for IDPs – UNHCR and IMPACT Initiatives presented the preliminary findings of the research on Legal Assistance Service Monitoring. In order to improve the quality of the legal assistance services and to ensure accountability to beneficiaries, IMPACT Initiatives (IMPACT) conducted a mixed-methods assessment with IDP households that received these services between September 2017 and May 2018. The assessment consisted of a baseline and endline, and focused on three questions: 1) How did the legal assistance services provided influence beneficiaries’ ability to obtain civil documentation?; 2) What were the residual barriers to obtaining documentation?; and 3) How did the possession of necessary documentation facilitate greater safety, freedom of movement and access to public services, employment and housing for Iraqi IDPs? For additional information, please contact Assistant Representative (Protection), Karen Whiting whiting@unhcr.org.

c. UNICEF Research on Birth Registration/Certificate – UNICEF presented on their documentation work related to birth registration/certificate. For more information, please contact Chief (Child Protection & Adolescent Development), Brigid Pfister at bpfister@unicef.org.

d. NRC Internal Research on Documentation for Women and Children in Retaken Areas (Anbar, Nineawa and Kirkuk governorates) – Undocumented children: barriers for accessing civil documentation for female-headed HHs
- In June 2018, NRC commissioned a consultancy to carry out research on the administrative, legal and sociocultural barriers to accessing civil documentation, particularly as faced by female headed households in the particular dynamics of post-conflict Iraq. The research was based on NRC’s ICLA programmes in Anbar, Kirkuk and Nineawa and focused on female headed HHs living in camps (Laylan, Daquq, HAA1 and 2, Qayara Airstrip, K18 and AAF). The objectives of the research was to map the pathways for and barriers faced by female-headed HHs seeking civil documentation for the heads of the HH and their children.
- The main barriers faced by female headed households in post-conflict Iraq found in the research are:
  a. Challenges related to the process of security screening. Particularly when applicants fail this screening process, protection actors currently have little resource to support them. There is presently no clear direct legal or administrative course of action for inability to support those who want to clear their names, except the option of starting a procedure to clear up the issue of when people have similar names.
  b. Lack of information and transparency on the processes involved in applying for and obtaining civil IDs. The research showed that there are many rumours about the process, due to a lack of clear information and transparency. However, there remain strong indications that perceived IS affiliation strongly affect a person’s chances of obtaining documents. A number of women reported that they were told by relatives that their request would be rejected, which resulted in them not even attempting to initiate the process.
  c. Barriers to freedom of movement. This right seems to be restricted in three main ways. First, women face difficulties in securing clearance through sponsorship from camp management to leave camps. Second, they face restrictions in their ability to cross checkpoints, which requires presenting an ID and sometimes having your name run against NSD database, as well as risks of harassment and exploitation at checkpoints. Third, whenever an IDP needs to access services at the Civil Directorate at their area of origin, they are not allowed to return to access the Civil Directorate, either by local authorities or security forces.
  d. Procedures to seek ‘Legal Separation, Guardianship and Dissociation’ in order to apply for IDs. Some women whose accused husbands are missing or diseased and are often perceived to be affiliated with IS reported having been pressured to undergo a process of declaring dissociation from their husbands as grounds for legal separation or obtaining guardianship. However, dissociation is considered a cultural practice, so it does not provide the claimant with any formal legal protection; only a statement that she has contributed to the arrest of her husband. The significance and implications of having dissociated is therefore entirely subject to the interpretation of local communities and security and legal authorities. A number of respondents showed serious concerns with the dissociation process and its sociocultural
implications for them, and thus refused to turn in their husbands or family members. Some female respondents believed that dissociation does not change the community’s perception of affiliation and that dissociation or separation would also lead to further stigmatization as a women headed household. In Anbar, cases were reported where after declaring dissociation, women had all of their property confiscated by authorities. Moreover, some women reported the fear of retaliation from their husbands or their husband’s family.

e. **REACH Initiative presentation on Intentions Survey findings** – postponed to next NPC meeting due to time constraints.

- Next NPC meeting to be held on 13 December from 11:00 am to 1:00pm.